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WHAT IS THE PROBLEM OF FILM THEORY?[1]

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> In the '70s, one position
> emerged... with some claim to
> provisional consideration as
> dominant. This position is
> an amalgam of Lacanian
> psychoanalysis, Althusserian
> Marxism, and the textual
> analysis of Roland Barthes,
> with a commitment to
> feminism.
> --- Noël Carroll[2]

Abstract

Searching for the facts that film theory purports to explain, I set
aside facts of perception, of film technique, and of social effects,
eventually settling on the facts of film history. Underlying the
theorizing about these and other facts I find four approaches to the
problem of evaluation, which I label essentialism, Tolstoyan
pragmatism, collectivism and historicism. All four spell philosophical
trouble, and it seems reasonable to ask of film theory that it steer
clear of obvious philosophical trouble. As the first step towards some
theorizing which does keep out of philosophical trouble I propose the
idea that historical facts present three different kinds of problems
which I call the problem of legitimation, the problem of value in
general, and the problem of value in particular. I conclude with a
discussion of in what order we should tackle this theoretical agenda.

The American philosopher of film Noël Carroll divides film theory into two:
classical film theory and modern film theory. Classical theory is what he

calls all film theory written in the period before the advent of structuralist, semiotic, post-structuralist, Marxist, and Lacanian theory.[3] Carroll finds that the divide between classical and modern theory is bridged by a philosophical error common to both: essentialism, and also that both classical and modern theorists have the hidden agenda of tailoring their theories to suit the kind of films they like best. These commonalities between classical and modern film theory I shall use as my authorization to generalise about them together.

In modern film (and literary) studies the term 'theory' is used promiscuously, to say the least. One could simply write off such use of 'theory' as bearing no interesting resemblance to its use elsewhere, especially philosophy. Tempted though I am to respond this way, I am restrained by the evidence of the quotation from Noël Carroll which I placed as the epigraph. Carroll is a trustworthy guide, yet the sentence quoted is uncharacteristically opaque. He writes of the modern theoretical position as an 'amalgam'. In an amalgam metals mix but do not combine. By his choice of word Carroll perhaps deliberately ironizes a position that mixes some unlikely ingredients: two pseudo-sciences - psycho-analysis and Marxism,[4] which also happen to stand in contradiction to one another;[5] textual analysis (whatever that may be); and advocacy of the rights of women.[6] This is a motley collection and an odd kind of theory. The questions a philosopher wants answers to are: in film studies are theories there to explain facts, and, if so, what are the facts needing explanation?

Facts and Theories

The received view in philosophy is that fact and theory are different. Both consist of declarative statements, but they operate, we sometimes say, at different levels. 'Facts' connotes statements about hard, concrete, discrete, perceptible things; the connotations of 'theory', by contrast, are

soft, abstract, general and imperceptible. The difference of levels is thought by some to be clear and sharp, by others to be a continuous gradient. Even if we grant that factual statements are no more than theoretical statements of a lower level, there is agreement that theories explain facts and are tested against them.

This points to an obvious question: what facts does film theory come to explain and be tested against?[7] In a survey of modern film theory, Lapsley and Westlake[8] classify the problematic facts into three groups: those pertaining to the spectator; those pertaining to the film maker; and those pertaining to the critic. How, they ask, does the spectator come to see patches of colour as faces, telephones and landscapes, how does the spectator then make judgements of character, judgements of morality, and judgements of pleasure about those constructions? Lapsley and Westlake write that comparable questions need to be answered for film makers. As for the critic, they say his factual problems are, how do signs signify and how are spectators affected by texts?

On Lapsley and Westlake's account, then, film theory overlaps the empirical psychology of perception and the imagination. Perhaps because of adherence to the pseudo-science of psychoanalysis, their formulation of the problematic facts of spectatorship is hopelessly out of date. It was long since decisively argued that we never do see patches of colour, we always see persons and things. Patches of colour turning into persons, places and things is a problem only for a phenomenalist theory of perception, one which treats the furniture of the world as derived entities. In film theory this phenomenalist view was decisively criticized by Hugo Munsterberg in 1916![9] Although reprinted in the nineteen-seventies, Munsterberg's book is missing from Lapsley and Westlake's references. Munsterberg was an experimental psychologist. How the spectator perceives film is certainly something which

students of the film should think about, but not while ignoring empirical psychology.

Lapsley and Westlake do not spell out how theories are needed to explain the facts of film making, so I can leave that area of possible facts for film theory to one side. Their specification of the facts needing explanation for the critic are very interesting. According to Lapsley and Westlake, the critic is interested in how signs signify and whether violent films increase mugging.[10] A surprising absence from Lapsley and Westlake's account is the critic struggling with the problems of criticism, that is, the merits or otherwise of particular films, or of the medium itself. Instead, their critic is straying into social science - the normal auspices for studies of the causal effects of media messages; and into the theory of reference and meaning, one of the darkest and deepest areas of language and philosophy where it would be safe to say there is virtually no consensus whatsoever, certainly none that film theorists are entitled to draw upon. It is with some regret that I sum up by noting that all of Lapsley and Westlake's empirical and conceptual facts needing explanation turn out to be the subject of extensive debate outside film studies, much of it proceeding empirically. We should hesitate, perhaps, to ask film theory to explain those kinds of facts.

Let me turn to another suggestion about the facts film theory comes to explain. In a methodological and theoretical treatise on the American musical, Charles F. Altman,[11] draws a broad distinction between film theorists who treat films as myths and ritual engaged in and enjoyed by the spectator, and those who treat films as ideological lies perpetrated by 'the system' on the spectator. This distinction cuts across the classical/modern divide. Although Altman writes of myth and ritual as 'contradictory' to the ideology approach,[12] he nevertheless attempts to fuse them by treating the myths-and-rituals view as the semantics of film and the ideological view as its syntax.

Obviously, syntax and semantics are complementary, not contradictory.
Unsatisfactory as this is, Altman uses it in his discussion of a particular
set of facts that pose problems for film theory not considered by Lapsley and
Westlake, namely the facts of film history. The problems historical facts
present are how to organize them around film genres and canonical works.
Here it seems to me we do have facts which call for theoretical explanation,
because many of the organizing principles used by film historians and genre
critics in the past flagrantly contradicted the facts, or were internally
inconsistent, or relied on criticizable assumptions such as: that film
history can be organized into a narrative; that film history is naturally
national; that film history undergoes a <u>coupure</u> at the end of every decade;
that serious or art films are distinct from and hence can be treated in a
context that ignores more frivolous and popular films; that aesthetic
judgements should be written in to the organization and writing of the
history and not stated and defended explicitly outside it; and so on.

   Whereas Lapsley and Westlake's problematic facts were unpromising for
film theory, Altman's suggestion that it is historical facts which are
problematic is very fruitful, especially as he explicitly allows that canon
formation, i.e. the critical assessment of films on aesthetic grounds, is
inescapable for organizing film history. Let us then say that the facts
which are problematic are those of film history, its organization and
evaluation.

   <u>Theories and Problems</u>

   A second expectation aroused by talk of 'theory' is 'problem'. Science,
philosophy, art, can be thought of as seeking explanation, that is, solutions
to problems.[13] R.G. Collingwood suggested that when we want to understand an
assertion, an explanation, a theory, we must first find out what the question
was to which the thing said or written was meant to be an answer.[14] A

stricter requirement, due to Popper, is that we ask of a theory, what problem is it aimed at and does it solve it? A problem is understood not as a question but as a contradiction, whether within the theory, between it and other theories, or between theories and statements of fact. A solution to a problem is a new theory that does not suffer from the previous inconsistency. A <u>satisfactory</u> solution is one which meets desiderata that go beyond that formal requirement. We have already seen that the facts of film history are problematic because they are not organized -- though they need to be: theory is required to make sense of history. Yet problems of this kind have been neglected. Classical film theory expended energy on the problems of the aesthetic evaluation of films, including the aesthetic evaluation of the film medium as such; modern film theory has expended energy on exposing the ideological lies of virtually all films produced under capitalist patriarchy. Both offer aesthetic evaluation, the one overtly, the other while denying it.

Several arguable if not mistaken philosophical theories underlie both classical and modern attempts at aesthetic evaluation. First, almost the whole of classical 'film theory' literature centres on one version or another of the problem 'what is the <u>essence</u> of film?' From the essence is thought to flow answers to the questions of which films are interesting, relevant, valuable, and so on. How else to decide whether film could possibly be a fine art? How else to differentiate the aesthetics of film from that of other, long-established arts? How else to establish its central standard other than by pinpointing its unique and distinguishing essence which individual works either conform to and fulfill, or resist and betray? How else could we be sure that film history dealt only with filmic films?

Second, within classical film theory as well as modern film theory there is also at work what we might call a <u>Tolstoyan pragmatism</u>: the search for a useful purpose film can serve, a purpose noble enough to give it the status of art. Art should transmit the highest emotions and be created by those

sincerely dedicated to the task. The two particular forms this takes in film theory I am going to call <u>historicism</u> and <u>collectivism</u>. Historicism is the view that there is a direction, if not an end, of history (I thus follow Popper's usage rather than the more widespread one). Collectivism is the philosophy which associates all virtue, including aesthetic virtue, with cleavage to the party of humanity. As long ago as 1915 we find both historicism and collectivism in Vachel Lindsay:

> In the future development of motion pictures mob movements of anger and joy will go through fanatical and provincial whirlwinds into great national movements of anger and joy...

> The World State is indeed far away. But as we peer into the Mirror Screen some of us dare to look forward to the time when the pouring streets of men will become sacred in each other's eyes, in pictures and in fact.[15]

An example of historicism is this by Richard Griffith writing in 1948:

> Technically, the future of the Hollywood film lies in a further working out of producer-writer-director relations. But the shape of the future lies with what happens to the mass-psyche in a period of what Siegfried Kracauer calls 'ideological fatigue'. There are many signs that the movie public would welcome courageous and challenging films, and just as many to indicate that the public will not ask for them of its own accord. Will it get them? The film-makers are singularly like their audiences. They too await the Messiah. In the meantime, they make musicals.[16]

As to the party of humanity, Griffith's co-author Rotha thanked Otto Neurath as one, 'who of all others I have met, understood most fully how the film could extend the consciousness of the international man-in-the-street'.[17] Rotha had earlier echoed the D.H. Lawrence version of Tolstoyan pragmatism, writing that a 'film significant and affirmatory of life can be called a microcosm of a microcosm....it is imperative for film-makers...never to lose touch with the realities of living'.[18]**]**

Or consider Lindsay Anderson, later a film-maker of some renown, who wrote at the period of the Angry Young Men:

> The cinema...is a vital and significant medium, and all of us who
> concern ourselves with it automatically take on an equivalent
> responsibility. And in so far as criticism is being written here and
> now, and deals with an art intimately related to the society in which we
> live, it cannot escape its wider commitments. Essentially, in fact,
> there is no such thing as uncommitted criticism, any more than there is
> such a thing as insignificant art. It is merely a question of the
> openness with which our commitments are stated. I do not believe we
> should be quiet about them.[19]

A little before this, Anderson had proclaimed that social and artistic

liberty, individualism, freedom of speech, assembly and worship, tolerance

and mutual aid were what 'everyone' believes in. As his challenger had said,

he values the 'simple, the warm and human, varied occasionally by hard-

hitting but unsensational social criticism'.[20]

These examples are from classical film theory. I take it that the

commitment of modern film theory to historicism and the party of humanity

needs no demonstration. As organizing and explanatory principles for the

facts of film history all of these philosophies - essentialism, Tolstoyan

pragmatism, collectivism, and historicism - fail woefully, being

simultaneously too narrow and too wide. Essentialism, as Carroll and others

have shown, favours the sorts of films the writer prefers, which then become

exemplifications of the essence, and tautologically excluding all else as not

genuinely filmic. This is too narrow. Analytically speaking, both

collectivism and historicism are variants of essentialism and so the same

applies. More specifically, anti-collectivist films, or films which refuse

to flow with the tides of history, can be explained and organized only by

means of unconvincing mental gymnastics. Conversely, all three views smile

too benignly on a great many films that do not deserve inclusion at all.

Hence they are too wide.

If all of these positions are unpromising, the field is open to a new

agenda and to argument for the ordering of its items, and to this I now turn.

<u>Theory and Tradition</u>

Film theory's overriding problems in organizing historical facts are, I suggest, the following:

a) The <u>problem of legitimation</u> of film as art. The traditional arts are historically structured traditions. They also had origins in courtly and aristocratic milieux, and/or in magic and religion. Do these facts imply that a medium that is new, has vulgar origins, and no connection to magic and religion, cannot be a fine art?

b) The <u>problem of value in general</u>. If film <u>is</u> a fine art does it not follow that there are good, bad, and mediocre films? What sorts of value are these, given the absence of an historical tradition, élitist, and magical origins? Should we seek out and list canonical works?

c) The <u>problem of value in particular</u>, namely, the scrutiny of any putative canonical lists in an attempt to discover in them standards of evaluation and achievement, arguments strong enough to do the work of discriminating the good from the bad and the indifferent. One would not expect to come across knock-down arguments, especially as some discriminations may rely on the cultivation of sensibility. Nevertheless, if film is a fine art, and if some films are better than others, we must strive to give tongue to possibly inchoate sentiments and intuitions about merit.

What is the best ordering of this agenda of problems? It seems to me that the general problem of legitimation is the least urgent, partly because it is presently far less controversial a topic than it was during the period of classical theory; but, more important, solutions to the problem of the canon, and of the standards disclosed there, would be decisive arguments to help settle the problem of legitimation. Thus problems b) and c) should have priority, and, since c), the problem of value in particular, depends upon b),

the problem of value in general, having a solution, the top of the agenda belongs to b), the problem of value in general.

In previous metatheoretical papers I have argued that the function of much criticism of the arts is to constitute and simultaneously legitimate the canon.[21] The canon consists of those pieces that are constantly discussed and referred to (as excellent). In discussions of poetry in English one will not find copious references to the work of William McGonigall. Discussions of the arts observe a rule which says, "bad stuff is not really worth discussing; it is only worthwhile discussing good stuff and why it is good". Now what is the right stuff is more controversial in film than in any of the established arts.[22] Hence it seems to me that when we discuss the film medium we are engaged as it were in making it an art by talking about it as though it were, rather than taking seriously essentialist or other a priori attempts to prove it is, or define it as. Was not this the way the other arts emerged as such and was it not the way their canon emerged as such?

Discussion centred on the constitution of a canon becomes, over time, the spine of an historical tradition of theorising about the art. A tradition is a social entity of a special kind. In the first place it is something that has not been consciously designed. It can be started or initiated, but it always takes on a life of its own (a fully planned tradition sounds oxymoronic). Traditions are such as those that surround ancient institutions like regiments, parliaments, monarchies, presidencies, organised religion, families, artistic schools, etc. Metaphorically, one can say that traditions live and grow. In the second place, traditions have an historical structure: they extend back in time, and refer back to themselves when used as premisses for action in the present. Hence the tradition of apprenticeship in the arts will, we say, have emerged over time (and atrophied over time, too). In the third place, because traditions are not created but emergent, and because they are older than their newest recruits,

they constitute something that can be rebelled against. The arts, not just in this century, characteristically have been traditions in which new generations of practitioners define themselves in opposition to the tradition as they see it, rather than in terms of it, which is the acquiescent reaction. Of course, it is also characteristic of the rubberiness of traditions that they can take such rebellions in their stride and, after the passage of time, the rebels, the modernists, the radical break, can all be seen as part and parcel of the historically structured tradition.

All these features - emergence, historical structure, and rebellion - already characterise the tradition of film-making and the tradition of film theorising. Although film is only one hundred odd years old (if you count silent films and sound films as one, and seventy odd years old if you do not), it seems already to have a rich and diverse history. As for rebellion: artistic enrichment seems alternately to come from diffusion of ideas and rebellion against them. Early sound films were stagy and static: Busby Berkeley's musical numbers were the opposite; the founders of neo-realism, Cesare Zavattini and Vittorio DeSica explicitly attacked what they called the 'white telephone' Italian films that preceded them. The French film-makers dubbed 'la nouvelle vague' had much the same attitude to their predecessors ('le cinéma du papa'). All in due course formed a new establishment that provoked further rebellion. Film theory, too, has not only adapted itself to explicating developments, such as sound, colour and wide-screen, but also has latterly engaged in internal debate sometimes of a bizarre complexity. Where film theory is deficient is the extent to which its historicity is ignored. Until the works of Tudor, Andrew, Mast, and Henderson in the nineteen-seventies, Carroll and Bordwell since the nineteen-eighties, each theorist seemed to begin ab initio, virtually as though they had no predecessors, as though film theory were not a living inquiry.

To the extent that film lacks a canon it lacks an important element of a healthy tradition in the arts, since it lacks the means of describing itself, evaluating itself, and identifying itself. Film theory, and the discussions around film theory - some disguised under the general rubric of criticism - are preliminaries, formation moves towards the growth of such a tradition. To a certain degree it is enough to say that because film is spoken of, written about, and treated as an art then it is one. Its presence in museums, college courses, sophisticated magazines, and seminars is in and of itself legitimation. But there has yet to emerge a canon on which we have sufficient perspective to say something about films that is equivalent to, "if J.S. Bach is not a great composer then no-one is". We have to remember, however, that J.C. and J.S. Bach had quite different relative standings in the eyes of their contemporaries to their standings now. Thus, the stature of Griffith or Eisenstein as against lesser known figures could in generations come to be completely changed.[23] We already sees something of this happening with Chaplin, where once he was almost universally hailed as a great film-maker, then one heard lone voices dissenting, and now he seems to be in the usual posthumous slump of reputation - which should not by any means be taken as the final judgment on him and his place. Similarly, the standing of Hollywood professionalism, once upon a time beneath contempt amongst film intellectuals, is now rather high.

So, then, in seeking to make film an art by discussing it as such, by seeking a canon and standards, we are ultimately affirming the value of the experience of film itself. If we declared that it had no standards, if it was always worth the same, it would be worth very little, and we would not see much value in viewing it at all. There is a connection here between the urge to value and the dignity of the valued. The high, middle- and low-brow may not agree in their evaluations, but they all engage in them. They all

make discriminations of the, "that was a <u>good</u> movie", and "that movie was a <u>stinker</u>", kind. Aesthetic assessment is part of the movie experience.

   Conclusion

   The problem of film theory, then, is the problem of, if not the task of, rendering film into an aesthetic object by means of discussions of that task, by the direct means of evaluating films, suggesting canonical films, analysing sequences, seeking arguments whereby good works can be discriminated from less good, whereby creativity can be isolated and credited, cultivating the sensibility so that one's experience can be enriched and one can educate others to appreciation, and all this is done in speech, journalism, critical writing, magazines, journals, books, seminars, college courses, museums, galleries, schools, and so on. It is inevitable that at the theory level this will be presented as such, and not framed in the meta-way I have framed it. People will go on, as Gerald Mast did, to state their substantial views on these matters.[24] Philosophers can indulge in that if they wish, but they can also step back and get a perspective that clarifies the process as a whole, if not the details which constitute it.

   This paper has been somewhat programmatic not because I prefer to tell others what to do to doing it myself (an occupational hazard in philosophy), but because, as I have argued, some lapse of time is intrinsically involved in the legitimation of theoretical film study. There cannot emerge an agreed-upon canon until there has been extensive discussion. In the meantime, we have to go on trying to do it and arguing about its doing knowing that nothing definitive will result because we are in the process of creating whatever in future years will be definitive, if anything ever is.

[1]. Based on a lecture delivered at the Dixième Colloque de l'Association Québecoise des Etudes Cinématographiques, Montreal, 14 November 1990. A much earlier version drawing examples mainly from classical film theory was read to the Pacific Division meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, 4 April 1980, where the commentators were Haig Khatchadourian and Lindley Hanlon.

[2]. Noël Carroll, 'Address to the Heathen', <u>October</u>, No. 23, Winter 1982, p. 89.

[3]. Noël Carroll, <u>Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory</u>, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988, p. 10. Carroll and his colleague David Bordwell have been at the centre of an effort to tame theory with the help of analytic philosophy. They sum up their views in a jointly edited volume, <u>Post-Theory</u>, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1996. Bordwell opposes Grand Theory because it seeks only to illustrate or verify itself. He prefers theorising upward from practical criticism, a kind of inductive ascent. I do not think this gets to the heart of the matter. For some considerations, see my 'Is Analytic Philosophy the Cure for Film Theory?', <u>Philosophy of the Social Sciences</u>, vol. 29, 1999, pp. 416-40.

[4]. The arguments for this characterization are gisted in K. R. Popper, <u>Conjectures and Refutations</u>, London: Routledge 1963, ch. 1.

[5]. Psycho-analysis is psychologistic, that is, it explains people and society by invoking universal psychological mechanisms; Marxism is materialistic and explains people and society by invoking economic and social institutions. Marx specifically denounced psychology ('consciousness') as an explanatory principle. Notoriously, Freud had no (that is, thought unnecessary any) theory of institutions.

[6]. How the latter got in there is anyone's guess. One wonders if Carroll simply forgot to include being against war, against eating meat, and for the environment on the shopping list.

After all, psychoanalysis saves our souls, Marxism saves humanity, Barthes saves the world for texts, and feminism saves women. Why leave out peace, animals and the environment?

[7] Some aestheticians, under the influence of Morris Weitz, use 'theory' to mean 'definition'. A theory of an art is a definition of that art. See Morris Weitz, "The role of theory in aesthetics", <u>Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism</u>, 15:27-35. I am grateful to Noël Carroll for drawing this to my attention. In my view the practice encourages scholasticism rather than fruitful inquiry.

[8]. Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake, <u>Film Theory: An Introduction</u>, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1988, p. vi.

[9]. Hugo Munsterberg, <u>The Photoplay, A Psychological Study</u>, New York: Appleton 1916.

[10]. Lapsley and Westlake, p. vi.

[11]. Charles F. Altman, <u>The American Film Musical</u>, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987, p. 94. For reasons best known to himself, Altman, author of an important article on historiography under his proper name ('Towards a Historiography of American Film', <u>Cinema Journal</u>, vol. XVI, Spring 1977, pp. 1-25), began in mid-career to sign himself confusingly as "Rick Altman".

[12]. My use of quotes is intended to forewarn. To a scientist or philosopher a contradiction is a fatal flaw. By contrast, Altman writes blithely: 'If we have learned anything from post-structuralist criticism, we have learned not to fear logical contradictions but instead to respect the extraordinary energy generated by the play of contradictory forces in a field' (p. 95). A world of confusion and equivocation is present in this sentence. For example, there is nothing in common between logical contradiction and contradictory forces in a field. What Altman means is that some ideological criticism endeavours to show that films contain contradictory messages, which are there because the ruling ideology contains contradictions. So far, logical contradictions are

meant. If the further assertion is made that the contradictions in the ideology are a product of the contradictions of the social system we have left the arena of logic and entered that of Hegelian muddle.

[13]. In the forty years or so I have been studying his work this has been central to the thinking of K.R. Popper, and of his principal followers: J. Agassi, W.W. Bartley, III, A. F. Petersen, D. Miller. J.N. Hattiangadi, 'The Structure of Problems, Part I and II', <u>Philosophy of the Social Sciences</u>, vol. 8, 1978, pp. 345-65 and vol. 9, 1979, pp. 49-76, is the most creative use of this view yet published. Hattiangadi would disapprove of my formulation, since he considers explanation a by-product of problem-solving rather than an aim. Sir Ernst Gombrich is the foremost exponent of the problems approach to art.

[14]. R.G. Collingwood, <u>An Autobiography</u>, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1939, ch. V.

[15]. Quoted from Lewis Jacobs, ed., <u>Introduction to the Art of the Movies</u>, New York: The Noonday Press 1960, pp. 56-7.

[16]. Paul Rotha and Richard Griffith, <u>The Film Till Now</u>, London: Vision 1963, pp. 508-9.

[17]. Rotha and Griffith, p. 60.

[18]. Rotha and Griffith, p. 52.

[19]. Lindsay Anderson, 'Stand Up! Stand Up!', <u>Sight and Sound</u>, vol. 26, 1956, p. 69.

[20]. John Russell Taylor, 'Letter', <u>Sight and Sound</u>, vol. 26, 1956, p. 110.

[21]. 'Towards an Objective Film Criticism', <u>Film Quarterly</u>, vol. 14, Spring 1961, pp. 19-32; 'The Objectivity of Criticism of the Arts', <u>Ratio</u>, vol. 9, 1967, pp. 67-83; 'The Rationality of Creativity', in Dennis Dutton and Michael Krausz, eds, <u>The Concept of Creativity in Science and</u>

Art', The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981, pp. 109-208. The last two have been reprinted in J. Agassi and I.C. Jarvie, eds., Rationality: The Critical View, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1987.

[22]. See Pauline Kael, 'Trash, Art and the Movies', in her Going Steady, Boston: Little Brown 1970, pp. 85-129.

[23]. As happened, for example, with claims about Griffith's having pioneered this or that, upon discovery of the paper prints collection at the Library of Congress.

[24]. Kael refuted Kracauer with musicals in, 'Is There a Cure for Film Criticism?', in I Lost it at the Movies, New York: Little Brown 1965, pp. 243-63. Mast refuted all film theories with animation in Film/Cinema/Movie, New York: Harper and Row 1977, pp. 14. Yet this excellent thinker went on to give the definition of film as: 'an integrated succession of projected images and recorded sounds', which makes one want to yell: silent films, slide shows, planetariums!